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As the economic core of inner cities has declined, economic developers have searched for 
revitalization strategies to spur sustainable economic growth while addressing inner-city poverty. 
A two-pronged approach to address both of these efforts simultaneously in inner cities is rare. 
The Market Creek Community Development Initial Public Offering (CD-IPO) is a model project 
designed both to create economic re-development of a brownfield inner-city site, and to provide a 
community-based asset-building opportunity for low- and moderate-income neighborhood 
residents to combat the incidence of poverty. The Market Creek CD-IPO was ―issued‖ in 2006 for 
a ten-acre, $23 million commercial real estate development in San Diego, CA. It was the result of 
an effort by the Jacobs Family Foundation to design a unique project to meet the needs of the 
Diamond neighborhood in southeast San Diego. Through an offering of ―shares‖ in the 
commercial real estate deal, lower- and moderate-income residents of the Diamond neighborhood 
were able to invest in about 20% of the total ownership of the Market Creek shopping center 
project in 2006. This case study will describe the particular Diamond neighborhood 
demographics and the role of the Jacobs Foundation in initiating the Market Creek project, and 
explore the investment structure and regulatory hurdles faced by the unique structure of the 
Market Creek CD-IPO, and the investment model it represents. Finally, this paper will offer a 
critique of some of the challenges and opportunities inherent in the Market Creek CD-IPO model.  
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Section 1: Inner-city Revitalization through Economic Development 
The economic backbone of inner cities has frayed since the 1960s. In conjunction with 
the de-industrialization of the United States economy, the decline of the manufacturing sector has 
eroded the economic base of cities. This decline has caused an increase in poverty and reduced 
the quality of life for many inner-city residents. Planners and economic developers have made 
efforts to reverse this trend and revitalize inner cities, with mixed results.  In the 1990s, a new 
philosophy animated some of these efforts; some economic development scholars, led by Michael 
Porter, advocated for unfettered activity in the private sector as the cornerstone for inner-city 
revitalization efforts. Porter (1995) saw untapped market potential in the underdeveloped aspect 
of the inner-city market.  To the extent that these markets are underserved in retail, financial, and 
personal service sectors, and often have a relatively high purchasing power per acre, but generally 
lack access to products differentiated for the tastes of inner-city customers, Porter (1995) and 
others saw hidden business opportunities that could flourish in the inner city under the right 
conditions.  The competitive advantages offered by the inner city, if recognized and 
unencumbered by government regulations, could thus entice the private sector to locate and do 
business in inner cities, stimulate the economy, and provide jobs and long-term opportunities to 
city residents. In this argument, Porter assumes that the majority of the private sector is simply 
unaware of the true market potential offered by inner cities, and thus needs only to recognize this 
market potential to unleash it.  For those private sector actors that have ventured into the inner 
city, Porter attributes their lack of viability to policy missteps of government agencies
1
 and 
―garbled communication‖2 between community development organizations and potential 
investors (Porter, 1997), rather than structural limitations of the private market.   
Porter’s decidedly free-market approach to urban revitalization critiques government and 
community development institutions as too cumbersome; he recommends reordering the roles of 
government and community development groups, towards strengthening private sector actors and 
creating more market opportunities and better business conditions in the inner city. Two of 
Porter’s key inner-city economic revitalization strategies, as paraphrased by Bates (1997) are:  
―attracting equity-capital investment to minority owned companies‖ and ―redirecting corporate 
involvement from philanthropy to serious business involvement.‖  Both of these strategies are 
                                                 
1
 Porter mentions inadequate infrastructure investments and maintenance as an example of a policy misstep. 
2
 Regarding ―garbled communication,‖ Porter (1997) says, ―Advocates for inner cities often feel that 
companies are not doing enough for their communities, whereas business people feel victimized by what 
they perceive to be unreasonable demands and expectations.‖ 
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driven primarily by private sector actors, and involve the injection of capital into the inner-city 
market. According to Porter (1997), these private mechanisms are more efficient in directing 
capital to the inner city than are alternative strategies, such as issuing small business debt or 
extending charitable philanthropy. Government, he says, should not provide direct incentives or 
operating subsidies for inner-city businesses, but rather ―create a favorable environment for 
business,‖ by more indirect methods, such as improving the public school system, training 
workers, upgrading infrastructure, and streamlining regulations (Porter, 1997).  According to 
Porter (1997), community development organizations should not get involved in business 
operations, offer alternative business services, or participate in business ownership, but should, 
rather, serve as a job-resources intermediary and facilitator of site development on behalf of 
private companies. By reducing government and community groups’ interference to a minimum, 
Porter suggests that the private sector will apply free-market principles to achieve beneficial 
outcomes for the inner city.  
Economic development scholars blanched in response to Porter’s suggestions to scale 
back on the direct engagement of public or community-based groups with inner-city residents. In 
a scathing critique of Porter’s market-driven proposition, Harrison and Glasmeier (1997) argue 
that successful stimulation of inner-city markets is not a default effect of private investment. 
Rather, they recognize the entrepreneurial actions of some city governments and some 
community development organizations as the drivers of strategy and intervention that achieve 
successful outcomes (Harrison & Glasmeier, 1997). For example, the type of institution that can 
most successfully administer job skills training is the subject of fierce debate within development 
circles and the policy literature; this debate can demonstrate the complexity of the participation of 
different types of institutional actors. Harrison and Glasmeier (1997) argue that Porter’s emphasis 
on indirect intervention courtesy of the private sector, such as job skills training, ultimately serves 
as a subsidy, not for small entrepreneurial businesses, but for mainstream businesses. Hence, such 
action often does not result in shared long-term benefits for the inner-city workforce (Harrison & 
Glasmeier, 1997). More specifically, private sector job-training programs likely focus on 
―employer conceptions of their immediate training needs rather than to industry-wide 
benchmarks‖ (Harrison & Glasmeier, 1997, referring to Glasmeier & Conroy, 1994)—training for 
which private sector employers would ordinarily pay internally (Osterman & Batt, Employer-
Centered Training for International Competativeness: Lessons from State Programs, 1993).  
Additionally, company-specific job training models do not often include all levels of education 
and racial or ethnic diversity in their program recruits (Osterman & Batt, Employer-Centered 
Training for International Competativeness: Lessons from State Programs, 1993). On the other 
  [3] 
 
hand, state-run job training programs show a bias toward larger firms, because it is 
bureaucratically easier for the state to deliver a few programs to a few large firms (Osterman & 
Batt, Employer-Centered Training for International Competativeness: Lessons from State 
Programs, 1993).  Often, these programs are also project-specific, pay little attention to system-
building, and do not operate within an integrated system of other available resources for job 
training participants (Osterman & Batt, Employer-Centered Training for International 
Competativeness: Lessons from State Programs, 1993). The best models for job training 
programs are rooted within community colleges, because these institutions are more 
bureaucratically stable, less likely to systematically exclude low-income groups and people of 
color, and are better able to coordinate between multiple state and federal programs (Osterman & 
Batt, Employer-Centered Training for International Competativeness: Lessons from State 
Programs, 1993).     
A specific example of collaboration between institutions is Project QUEST in San 
Antonio, one of the most successful workforce intermediary programs in the country. Project 
QUEST was founded by two community organizations that worked with businesses to create 
demand-driven workforce training programs (Osterman & Lautsch, Project QUEST: A Report to 
the Ford Foundation, 1996).  The actual job training took place almost exclusively in community 
colleges, and both Project QUEST staff and the community colleges worked together to design 
the training program curriculum (Osterman & Lautsch, Project QUEST: A Report to the Ford 
Foundation, 1996). Project QUEST also included high-level support of job training program 
participants, including assistance in navigating the community college system; as well as a wide 
range of emotional, personal, and family support (Osterman & Lautsch, Project QUEST: A 
Report to the Ford Foundation, 1996).   The high-level of support distinguishes Project QUEST 
from other job training programs, and is considered pivotal to its success (Osterman & Lautsch, 
Project QUEST: A Report to the Ford Foundation, 1996). Through these unique features, Project 
QUEST created institutional change by protecting workers, raising wages, and delivering local, 
qualified candidates to specific jobs in the business community (Osterman & Lautsch, Project 
QUEST: A Report to the Ford Foundation, 1996).   For Harrison and Glasmeier (1997), these 
types of decisive policy initiatives and strategic collaboration between governments, the private 
sector, and community development groups are required to create successful economic 
development opportunities to initiate inner-city revitalization. 
 Porter (1997) offers another example of a successful, free-market-based inner-city 
initiative, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which is a federal law designed to encourage 
financial institutions to take deposits and meet the credit needs of all communities, particularly 
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including low- and moderate-income communities. He refers specifically to the financial sector’s 
participation in such projects by discussing and Bank of America’s lending, under the auspices of 
the CRA, to the Neighborhood Advantage program in 1990. Porter attributes the success of the 
program to determination of creditworthiness by ―nontraditional methods‖ and correlates the 
―lower down payments‖ required under this initiative with lower foreclosure rates. However, 
Porter does not acknowledge the very market failure that the CRA addresses by forcing banks to 
serve the so-called secondary market of inner-city residents, where the secondary market includes 
those who are excluded from the free market due to lower income levels, or because of their 
social status as persons of color, for example. Nor does Porter acknowledge how widespread that 
secondary market may be. These oversights constitute a key missing piece within his free-market 
endorsement for inner-city revitalization, and demonstrate an additional condition beyond the 
poor government policies and ―garbled communication‖ that he blames for economic slumps in 
inner cities.   
In his emphasis on self-sufficiency of private sector initiatives, Porter overlooks some of 
the issues faced by inner-city business owners, due to market failures specific to the inner city. 
Beyond the regulatory hurdles identified by Porter, such as extensive permitting requirements, 
inner-city entrepreneurs do not have access to financial products and services equivalent to those 
available to their suburban or ex-urban counterparts. Regarding Porter’s salve of attracting equity 
capital investment to minority-owned companies, Harrison and Glasmeier (1997, referring to 
Bates) explain that higher debt-to-equity ratios contribute to the high rate of failure of start-up 
businesses in urban minority neighborhoods.  In this example, the private sector’s institutional 
norms dictate discrimination based on race, which results in more unfavorable loan terms and 
thus business failure. This is a market failure almost specific to the inner city, where most 
minority entrepreneurs reside.  
 Market failures are accepted as part of our economic system in the United States. 
However, it is worth examining the ―failure,‖ not as inherent to the free market, but as an aspect 
of the institutions that we have created in order to structure market-based exchange. As Harrison 
and Glasmeier show, market forces by themselves do not cause upturns or downturns, but rather 
do so in interaction with the nature of institutions that prevail. Hernando de Soto (2000) writes 
about the construction of financial systems in the West, and critiques the institutional structure in 
a way that can shed light on Porter’s debate. De Soto (2000) makes the point that financial 
systems in the West are constructed to transform earnings, inherited capital, and land ownership 
into wealth.   He contrasts the United States with developing nations such that, despite the 
innovations found in developing countries in real estate development and the ―entrepreneurial‖ 
  [5] 
 
use of space, developing nations are weighted down with ―dead capital‖ when compared with the 
U.S. and other developed nations (de Soto, 2000). That is, dead capital is a capital resource that 
cannot be leveraged to create further wealth, not because of the value of the capital, but because 
no mechanism exists to leverage it.  In developing nations, there are no financial institutions and 
structures to title, deed, and leverage property ownership (de Soto, 2000).  Thus, developing 
nations are unable to transform property ownership and entrepreneurial behaviors into leveraged 
capital, such as a mortgage with which to borrow money in order to grow additional businesses or 
property ownership. While such institutional structures clearly exist in the U.S., not everyone can 
utilize them, again, because of income level or other factors. However, since these financial 
systems are constructed, it stands to reason that we can and should design additional financial 
systems to serve those individuals within the secondary market in order to pursue economic 
equity. Often, government programs or community-based organizations develop the programs to 
offer wealth-building opportunities for these individuals in the secondary market.  To extend de 
Soto’s ideas, low- and moderate-income groups in the inner city could already have significant 
capital, as Porter also claims. However, these groups may also need the development of 
institutions and financial vehicles if they are to act as intermediaries to build wealth from their 
assets, because, despite the free market potential in the inner city, this potential cannot be realized 
by market forces alone. Though de Soto sees property ownership as a panacea, it is not 
necessarily a guaranteed pathway to economic security. While de Soto’s argument is notable for 
his focus on harnessing the market to generate wealth in poor communities, a closer reading of 
what it will take to do so highlights the constructed nature of the institutional mechanisms that 
can help activate ―dead capital.‖    
 Porter (1997) believes that the creation of income and wealth can be achieved by 
―harnessing market forces.‖ While this may be true for primary free-market participants, or those 
who are able to access mainstream financial institutions to leverage their capital and resources, 
the responses to Porter’s article by Harrison and Glasmeier (1997) and Bates (1997) show the 
institutional processes undergirding these seemingly market-driven processes. Hence, government 
policies and community development groups may be best suited to extend market services and 
benefits to the secondary market, but this does not exclude work with the private sector.  In order 
to revitalize inner cities through growth, equity in the economic development process is important 
to ensure long-term success. As Harrison and Glasmeier assert, government and community 
development groups may be the best suited to broker public-private partnerships with a greater 
goal of equity in development.    
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The Market Creek Community Development Initial Public Offering (CD-IPO) project 
provides a case study from which to analyze new vehicles for urban revitalization and economic 
development with equity. The Market Creek (CD-IPO) is a rare example of a project designed to 
both create economic re-development of a brownfield inner-city site, and to provide a 
community-based asset-building opportunity for low- and moderate-income neighborhood 
residents to combat the incidence of poverty. By examining the institutional supports that made 
this project possible, I argue that the Market Creek Community Development IPO is the product 
of intense collaboration between government, community development, and private sector actors 
working together to create and implement this innovative model. While the CD-IPO model was 
developed by the Jacobs Family Foundation and its associated partner organizations (referred to 
as the Jacobs Network), the foundation sought special certifications from state and local 
government officials, and utilized strengths of grassroots community groups and skills unique to 
the Jacobs Foundation. This case study will show how the innovative model of the Market Creek 
CD-IPO replicates some aspects of other successful market interventions and recombines them in 
a new way with the goal of increasing equity in economic development.   Planners will learn that 
the pursuit of equitable economic growth requires us to build values of equity into our political, 
financial, and social institutions.   
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the context of asset-
building strategies, of which the Market Creek CD-IPO is a part. Section 3 is divided into ten 
sub-sections that make up the bulk of the case study; these sub-sections provide project 
background (3.1), explain the research methodology (3.2), examine the hands-on grant-making 
process of the Jacobs Foundation (3.3), describe the demographics of the Diamond neighborhood 
(3.4), illustrate the community outreach process and the inception of the CD-IPO (3.5), analyze 
the investment structure of the CD-IPO (3.6), detail other sources of funds from the secondary 
market (3.7), explain the key role of New Market Tax Credits in the project (3.8), describe the 
institutional supports provided by the state (3.9) and the city (3.10) for the Market Creek Plaza 
project (3.9), outline the workforce training and capacity-building impacts (3.11). Section 4 
discusses the effect of the recent economic downturn on the project. Section 5 concludes the case 
study and highlights some lessons for planners.   
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Section 2: Creating Wealth in Inner Cities: Investment Strategies  
for Asset-Building 
 
Long-term wealth can increase equity and stability for city residents of all income levels, 
and thus provide the sustainable growth that is necessarily at the core of inner-city revitalization. 
As part of this effort, economic developers must address the high incidence of poverty in inner 
cities.  Recent policies geared towards empowerment of inner-city residents, likely low-income 
groups or communities of color, have focused on self-sufficiency of hardworking families rather 
than on a welfare-based model. However, American families require more than just a job and an 
income to move out of poverty. Rather, they need to find ways to increase its net worth (assets 
less debts). Asset-building programs operate as add-on tools to help working families sidestep 
poverty. Building assets such as owning a home, completing higher education, owning a business, 
or saving for retirement are ways to shore up a family’s financial future and increase their net 
worth. Traditionally, the nation’s policies for wealth accumulation have primarily benefited those 
at the highest income levels. Since the early 1990s, asset-building programs have grown to target 
low- and moderate-income people so that they may also benefit from the economic wealth in the 
American economy.   
Asset-building programs can be divided into two types of strategies: savings strategies 
and investment strategies. Savings strategies focus on policies and tools that enable people to 
save money in order to accumulate financial assets. Individual Savings Accounts (IDAs), 
matched savings accounts targeted towards helping income-qualifying individuals save for long-
term productive assets such as homeownership, were the first policy tool of this type. Since the 
early 1990s, IDAs have been expanded to include asset targets beyond homeownership such as 
higher education, business ownership, and retirement savings (Gale, 2006). Additionally, IDA 
programs were developed to focus on savings accounts for children, particularly for children’s 
college education. While studies have shown that lower income people can succeed at saving 
(Schreiner, Clancey, & Sherraden, 2002), unexpected financial events, such as a medical 
emergency or extensive automobile repair, have meant that people have had to withdrawal 
savings, thus losing the matched amounts – and have indicated some failures in IDA programs 
(Gale, 2006).   
Investment strategies to build assets have traditionally been focused on homeownership 
programs. However, just as many upper-income individuals have a diversity of assets beyond 
their home equity to offset financial instability, it follows that lower-income individuals need the 
same diversity of assets to protect them against economic downturns. Additionally, 
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homeownership may not always be the best investment for low-income people due to fluctuations 
in the housing market, as evidenced by the deflation of home values in the current housing crisis. 
Therefore, other opportunities for investment and financial return on assets may offer an 
alternative primary or supplementary vehicle for investment to the ends of raising a family’s net 
worth. Asset-building investment programs include vehicles to contribute to increased business 
owner equity, such as worker-owned cooperatives, employee wealth-sharing mechanisms, and 
collective ownership of community businesses (McCulloch, 2006).  A relatively new vehicle to 
provide lower income individuals with alternative opportunities for investment in assets is a 
community development initial public offering in commercial real estate, which is the subject of 
the case study highlighted in this paper.  
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Section 3: Market Creek Community Development IPO Case Study 
 3.1: Introduction 
The Jacobs Family Foundation ―issued‖ the Market Creek CD-IPO, a ten acre, $23 
million commercial real estate development in San Diego, CA, in 2006.  As part of their strategy 
of a long-term, hands-on grantmaking process, the Jacobs Family Foundation designed a unique 
project to meet the needs of the diverse groups of persons and families in the Diamond 
neighborhoods in southeast San Diego. Through an offering of ―shares‖ in the commercial real 
estate deal, lower and moderate income residents of the Diamond neighborhood were able to 
invest in about 20% of the total ownership of the Market Creek shopping center project in 2006.  
The other 80% of project financing was obtained from a mixture of private sources and 
foundation support. The Market Creek CD-IPO also utilized local and state governmental 
regulatory supports and federal New Markets Tax Credits. 
3.2: Research Methodology 
 Analysis of this case study was geared towards understanding the details of the Market 
Creek Community Development IPO structure, particularly of the institutional supports that 
facilitated the model’s development.  To learn about the project’s complex structure, I gathered 
data about the project from published materials, newspaper articles, and the Jacobs Neighborhood 
Center for Innovation annual report. I also researched neighborhood plans in the city of San 
Diego.  To obtain supplemental data and additional detail, I conducted several thirty minute 
phone interviews with project participants, including local city planners, and Jacobs Foundation 
representatives in both community development and private-sector development aspects of the 
organization.  The interviews were open-ended, with a loosely structured pre-prepared protocol of 
key questions and themes.   
 To select interview participants, I conducted a stakeholder analysis and listed all salient 
―roles‖ in the Market Creek project. I obtained the names of a few people that work at the Jacobs 
Foundation based on articles about the project from the Jacobs’ Foundation website that included 
specific names, pictures, and e-mails of Market Creek CD-IPO project contacts. I obtained further 
contact information about other ―roles‖ from Jacobs Foundation contacts during initial interviews, 
including email addresses, based on whom they worked with on the project. Additionally, I spoke 
with a few alumni from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Master’s program in 
City and Regional Planning, whose names were provided to me by my department as persons 
working in the planning field in San Diego. I asked the alumni for names of city officials within 
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the planning field who work in the neighborhood areas where the project took place, or who are 
engaged in related fields of philanthropy or community development finance, and might have 
worked on the project. Since interview subjects were primarily identified through referrals by 
other subjects, a technique called snowball sampling, there may be some pro-project bias in the 
sample. For the purposes of my research aims, which sought to understand the process and 
dynamics of why and how the Market Creek CD-IPO came about, this convenience sampling 
methodology was important. Interviewees that provided information about the project that is 
included in this case study are anonymously indentified through their organization name, and a 
number if applicable, in accordance with Institutional Review Board protocols approved for the 
case study. 
 
3.3: Jacobs Family Foundation: Embracing a Hands-on Grant-making Strategy 
The Jacobs Family Foundation (JFF) is a San Diego-based foundation that developed a 
long-term, hands-on grant-making strategy with an intense geographic focus in the Diamond 
neighborhoods of southeast San Diego (Jacobs Family Foundation - Who We Are), the location 
where the case study takes place. JFF was founded in 1988 by the Jacobs family, Joseph J. Jacobs 
Jr., Violet Jacobs, and their daughters (Jacobs Family Foundation - Who We Are). Their current 
$25 million in endowment funds were set aside when the family business, Jacobs Engineering 
Group, went public (The Funder's Network - Member Profiles, 2003). From 1988 to 1997, JFF 
primarily focused on grant-making and technical assistance targeted on community-based non-
profits located overseas (The Funder's Network - Member Profiles, 2003), several of which were 
in the Middle East (Jacobs Network contact #1, personal communication, April 2009).  However, 
in September 1998, JFF began to align its portfolio investments closer to its philanthropic mission 
by investing in ventures like UrbanAmerica, L.P. (The Funder's Network - Member Profiles, 
2003), a pioneering commercial real estate firm that specialized in acquisition and development 
of commercial centers in diverse, inner-city markets (UrbanAmerica - Investment Strategy, 
2008).  Perhaps inspired by the work of UrbanAmerica, L.P. and dissatisfied with the effects of 
its current grant-making strategies abroad, JFF changed its grant-making strategy around the time 
of this investment. JFF developed a new philanthropic strategy focused on place-based 
community development through direct investment, in order to have more control over its impact 
(The Funder's Network - Member Profiles, 2003).  
Originally headquartered in Pasadena, CA where the Jacobs Engineering firm was also 
located, JFF relocated its headquarters to San Diego where the daughters of Joseph and Violet 
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Jacobs then lived (Jacobs Network contact #1, personal communication, April 2009). One of 
JFF’s initial projects in the Diamond neighborhoods of San Diego was working with the 
Elementary Institute of Science (EIS), an organization that offers after school technology and 
science learning programs for children (Jacobs Network contact #1, personal communication, 
April 2009). The foundation worked with EIS to expand their efforts from operating out of ―a 
two-bedroom ramshackle white house‖ in a run-down neighborhood to operating with a $7-8 
million endowment (Jacobs Network contact #1, personal communication, April 2009). Working 
with EIS to accomplish this transformative change inspired the founders of JFF.  After 1999, all 
of JFFs resources and efforts were focused in the Diamond neighborhoods, specifically in the 
Market Creek Plaza project. To serve its goals of achieving more profound grant-making impacts 
and catalyzing community change from within, Jacobs hired a team of community residents to 
survey their neighbors about the community’s priorities (The Funder's Network - Member 
Profiles, 2003). Over 600 interviews were conducted by resident survey teams in four languages 
during this time period, and the material gathered in these interviews formed the basis of the 
community vision for Market Creek Plaza. Diamond neighborhood residents talked about 
wanting to ―put their own hard-earned money into projects in their neighborhood‖ (Jacobs 
Network contact #2, personal communication, April 2009). Mr. Jacobs, a lifelong entrepreneur, 
also believed that people would be more personally invested in their neighborhoods if they had 
some ―skin in the game‖3 or owned what is there (Jacobs Network contact #1, personal 
communication, April 2009). Along these lines, one of JFF’s mission statements is ―resident 
ownership in neighborhood change.‖ 
In order to facilitate resident empowerment, JFF institutionalized an incredibly diverse 
skill set through development of a group of related organizations which is referred to by Jacobs’s 
staff as ―the Jacobs Network.‖  The Jacobs Network includes several non-profit and for-profit 
entities, such as the Jacobs Family Foundation; the Jacobs Center for Neighborhood Innovation; 
Diamond Management, Inc.; Market Creek Partners; Market Creek Community Ventures; the 
Jacobs Community Development Group; The Village at Market Creek; and various property-
holding Limited Liability Corporations (LLCs) (Jacobs Family Foundation - Contact Us). All the 
entities in the Jacobs Network collaborate on Market Creek Plaza and other efforts in the 
Diamond Neighborhoods.  Within the Jacobs Network, Jacobs’ staff can acquire properties, build 
and subcontract construction, provide property management, run security and maintenance 
services, provide tenant leasing, offer business development services, and broker property sales 
(Jacobs Network contact #1, personal communication, April 2009). This contact said that 
                                                 
3
 Expression attributed to Warren Buffet. 
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working for Jacobs is a ―twenty-four hour per day job,‖ and that someone working on the project 
―cannot be involved in the project on a cursory basis.‖ Because so much of Jacobs’ work is driven 
by participation of neighborhood residents, most meetings take place in the evenings when 
residents are away from their jobs (Jacobs Network contact #1, personal communication, April 
2009).  Based on the description of the level of staff involvement required to make the project 
viable, it could be argued that Jacobs Network staff internalizes the hands-on grant-making 
strategy that is explicit in JFF’s mission. The large range of services and resources offered by the 
Jacobs Network demonstrates its dexterity in both the market-driven and the philanthropic 
realms.   
Unlike many other foundations, JFF is a ―limited life‖ foundation, which means that it 
will terminate its operations, or sunset, around 2020.  Since the foundation’s Board of Directors is 
managing the funds to be depleted by the sunset date, JFF manages its assets in a different way 
than most other foundations. While perpetual foundations cautiously manage their portfolio 
toward long-term investments, JFF more aggressively manages its assets to leverage them during 
the time period of its operations. Pursuing maximum leverage means accepting increased risk in 
investments, such as an atypically high proportion of the endowment held in stocks and bonds –
about 50% (Jacobs Network contact #1, personal communication, April 2009). JFF also holds a 
high proportion of its assets in ownership of neighborhood properties (Jacobs Network contact 
#1, personal communication, April 2009).  At the time that JFF sunsets, its funds will be spent 
and properties such as the Market Creek Plaza project will transfer to private self-management by 
neighborhood organizations and institutions.  JFF is working with neighborhood resident teams to 
discuss this succession process and craft institutional capacity within the neighborhood to support 
the project after JFF transitions out (Jacobs Network contact #2, personal communication, April 
2009). While succession planning is still occurring, an institutional examination of this transition 
would surely be informative in further study. 
 
3.4: Not Your Typical Investor Profile: Diamond Neighborhood Demographics 
The Jacobs Network (Jacobs) encountered modest income demographics and a high 
proportion of people of color and diverse cultural backgrounds in the Diamond neighborhoods, 
especially when compared to the city of San Diego as a whole. This demographic profile is 
typical of the type of neighborhoods that Porter and Harrison and Glasmeier were debating as a  
prime site for market-driven or community development investments intended to stimulate the 
inner-city economy.  
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The Diamond neighborhoods of southeast San Diego are comprised of ten neighborhood 
sub-areas including Chollas View, Emerald Hills, Lincoln Park, Mountain View, Mount Hope, 
North Encanto, Oak Park, South Encanto, Valencia Park, and Webster. A comparison of 
population and income demographics of the Diamond neighborhoods and San Diego city is 
shown in Exhibit 1.  
Approximately 
88,000 residents live in the 
Diamond neighborhoods 
(Market Creek Plaza - 
Diamond Neighborhood).  
The median household 
income is $32,000 (Green, 
2006), while the citywide 
average is higher at $46,000 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). 
Thirty percent of residents live on less than $20,000 per year (Green, 2006), a greater percentage 
than the citywide average of 20% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).  Fifty-two percent of residents 
own their own homes, which is slightly higher than the city wide average of 50%. Based on these 
demographics, it appears that the Diamond neighborhoods have a lower income profile than the 
average for the city 
of San Diego. 
A 
breakdown of ethnic 
and racial diversity 
in the Diamond 
neighborhoods 
compared to San 




is 46% as opposed to 25% of San Diego (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). The African-American 
population in the Diamond neighborhood makes up 27% of people living in the neighborhood, 
while African-Americans only represent 8% of the citywide population (U.S. Census Bureau, 
 
Exhibit 1:  Population and Income Demographics for 





Population 88,000 1,223,400 
Median Household Income $32,000 $46,000 
Less Than $20,000 30% 20% 
Own Home 52% 50% 
*Source: Jacobs Foundation, citing U.S. Census 2000. 

















Hispanic African-American Asian-American White
Exhibit 2:  Racial & Ethnic Demographics of Diamond 
Neighborhoods Compared to San Diego
Diamond Neighborhoods San Diego
Source: U.S. Census 2000
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2000). In contrast, the white population of the Diamond neighborhoods is 9%, while whites make 
up 60% of the population of San Diego (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000).  Significant populations of 
Laotian, Samoan, Filipino, and Somali groups live in the Diamond neighborhoods as well 
(Robinson, 2005).   The ethnic diversity of the Diamond neighborhoods was a significant factor 
in the neighborhood outreach process at the initial stages of the project. 
 
3.5: Community Outreach and CD-IPO Inception  
 
Even before Jacobs purchased its first ten-acre piece of property, the Jacobs Family 
Foundation solicited input from neighborhood residents on the types of community projects that 
would benefit the Diamond neighborhood (Robinson, 2005). When surveyed by community 
teams, neighborhood residents said that they wanted to invest in neighborhood businesses, to 
exert more control over the types of retail businesses in their community, and to make provisions 
to keep jobs local (Robinson, 2005). Specifically, residents voiced desire for a grocery store and 
entertainment options in the neighborhood, and requested that liquor stores be shut down (Jacobs 
Network contact #1, personal communication, April 2009). These initial interviews were gathered 
into the ―top ten‖ guiding goals that formed the vision for the Market Creek effort (Jacobs 
Network contact #1, personal communication, April 2009). Jacobs made special efforts to address 
the different cultural groups in the Diamond neighborhoods by inviting each ethnicity to host a 
cultural event at Jacobs offices, which included sharing in the particular food, clothing, traditions 
and culture of each (Robinson, 2005). Jacobs also recruited participants from all cultural groups 
to serve on resident teams.  
Cross-cultural resident teams were formed and worked on outreach, art and design, 
construction, business development and leasing, ownership design, resource development, and 
childcare committees (Robinson, 2005). Over 2,860 individuals participated in the Community 
Design and Planning Team, and 1,082 individuals participated on fifty-two ―Working Teams‖ 
(Jacobs Center for Neighborhood Innovation, 2008).  Similar to some of the additional resources 
offered to support job training participants in Project QUEST, Jacobs offered supportive 
resources to residents to better facilitate their participation. One mother of four was quoted in a 
PolicyLink case study (Robinson, 2005) as saying:  
 
[Jacobs Center for Neighborhood Innovation] has really encouraged me to participate. They built 
an indoor play area with a big glass window so that we can see our kids. Also, we talked about 
which hours would work best. I can’t make afternoons because I start picking up my kids at 2:30. 
Also they provide food so I can bring my kids and they can eat.  
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Jacobs Network also offered some stipends to neighborhood residents who made ―a 
particularly intensive and sustained contribution to the work‖ (Robinson, 2005). Some team 
members who worked between ten and fifteen hours per week were paid $6.50 and, later $8, per 
hour to compensate them for neighborhood-specific project knowledge and problem-solving 
skills dedicated to the project (Robinson, 2005). Interestingly, resident teams involved in 
planning have been folded into the Jacobs Network institutional structure during the 
implementation and operations stages of the project (Jacobs Network contact #2, personal 
communication, April 2009). The continued involvement of neighborhood residents is rare within 
the planning field; often, stakeholder involvement stops after the plan-making stage. In the case 
of the Market Creek Plaza project, residents continue to help the Jacobs Network to design the 
vision and institutional structures as the project moves forward. 
A Jacobs Network contact said that the ―rule of thirds‖ was a guiding principle for the 
neighborhood residents on the Ownership Design team when they helped to design the Market 
Creek Plaza Community Development-IPO (Jacobs Network contact #2, personal 
communication, April 2009). The ―rule of thirds‖ is a community development principle where 
one-third of a community’s resources should be dedicated to individual benefit, one-third should 
be shared with the community, and one-third should be set aside for long-term sustainability 
(Jacobs Network contact #2, personal communication, April 2009). On the administrative level, 
Joe Jacobs and the Board of Directors identified a need to facilitate neighborhood residents to be 
able to invest in the ownership of their own neighborhood, but there was no investment vehicle to 
do so at the time the project started (Jacobs Network contact #2, personal communication, April 
2009). Particularly, there was no mechanism to confine financial benefits of ownership of a 
community to that specific community. Also, neighborhood residents did not meet the State of 
California’s threshold for ―qualified investors‖ because of income and net worth requirements 
dictated by traditional valuation procedures. Jacobs Network contact #2 explained that, ―the 
resident teams and foundation staff set about to develop a new tool for community development 
that could be accessible by anyone in the community, had a broad outreach within the 
community, and with a lower threshold for income and net worth than a typical investor.‖ This 
innovative tool was the Market Creek Plaza Community Development IPO (CD-IPO), the 
structure of which is explained in the next section.
4
  
                                                 
4
 Note: Other than the stories and theoretical guidelines provided here, I could not ascertain from published 
materials or through interviews more detail about who administered the CD-IPO or what expertise was 
needed to do it. Jacobs Network contacts appeared to be willing to convey only that it was a general group 
effort between the Jacobs Network and neighborhood residents.  
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3.6: Investment Structure of Market Creek CD-IPO 
 The Market Creek CD-IPO works similarly to a public offering on the stock market, in 
that a financial investment in the project can earn a profit-based return and provide an ownership 
stake. Though the Market Creek Plaza project ultimately required additional funding, a total of 
$2.5 million of the $23.6 million of total investment was eligible for an ownership stake and 
investment dividends (Exhibit 3).  The CD-IPO investment structure was designed to allow for 
some commercial bank funding, some non-profit and grant funding, and some private 
investments. The community development aspect of the project allows for the private-investor 
component to include investors of low to moderate income, who live or work in the community. 
 
Twenty percent of the ownership-qualified investment, or up to $500,000, was reserved 
for investments by the Diamond Community Investors (DCI), a partnership group for 425 
community investors (representing 600 people such as spouses, children, or church groups) 
(Market Creek Partners, 2008) from the adjacent ten neighborhood sub-areas in the Diamond 
Neighborhoods (Market Creek Plaza - Diamond Neighborhood). Investors from DCI could 
purchase ―shares‖ in the development for $10, with a minimum purchase of twenty shares. 
Investments were capped at $10,000 and the average investment was $1,185 (Market Creek 
Partners, 2008). After the center was opened in 2006, DCI participants became eligible for a 
preferred return on investment up to 10% (Green, 2006). Investors could opt into a payment plan 
for the investment, and non-profits and churches could also invest in the project. The investments 
from DCI were placed into the commercial center’s infrastructure, but not into the businesses 
operating there, which reduced some of the investment risk as long as property values hold 
constant (Green, 2006). Additionally, 60% of the ownership-qualified investment was made by 
Exhibit 3: Sources of Funding and Ownership-Qualified Investments 
  Monetary Amount Ownership 
Diamond Community Investors (425 Investors) $500,000 20% 
Jacobs Center for Neighborhood Innovation $1,500,000 60% 
Neighborhood Unity Foundation $500,000 20% 
 






Additional PRI Investments (Foundations) 
$6,100,000 Not eligible 
New Markets Tax Credit Loan $15,000,000 Not eligible  
Total Project Funding $23,600,000   
Source: Social & Economic Impacts Report, Calendar Year 2007. The Village at Market Creek. 
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the Jacobs Center for Neighborhood Innovation and its management company (Market Creek 
Partners, 2008). The final 20% was invested by the Neighborhood Unity Foundation, a 
neighborhood-led charity administered by the Jacobs Family Foundation (Market Creek Partners, 
2008). A unique aspect of the ownership structure is the representation of one investor to one vote 
(Jacobs Network contact #2, personal communication, April 2009). Rather than a proportional 
ownership voting structure, such as is the case with venture capital and other investment deals, 
Jacobs Network staff and resident teams structured the management framework of the CD-IPO to 
ensure that residents have presiding authority over a large portion of the investment (since there 
are a greater number of residents than Jacobs Network representatives in the deal).    
Community residents played a key role in recruiting their neighbors to participate as 
resident investors and helped to convince them to overcome skepticism about the investment tool. 
Regarding this process, a contact from the Jacobs Network said:  
 
Members of the resident ownership team had helped design it so they were able to explain what 
the risks were to other residents. Mid-way through the offering period, the church networks in the 
neighborhood began to get involved, as well as other resident groups.  On the last day of the 
offering (Oct 31, 2006) there was a line around the block. Jacobs met both its participation and 
investment goals, with 425 investors and $500,000 in investment. 
 
Materials given to potential investors clearly outlined the potential risks associated with 
investment, namely that the Jacobs ―company‖ was new, that profits were not guaranteed, that the 
investment was long-term, and that there was a possibility that shares could not be sold unless the 
potential buyer met the investor qualifications for the project (Jacobs Center for Neighborhood 
Innovation, 2006). 
If the Market Creek shopping center makes a profit, the investment contract dictates that 
annual dividends will be paid to Diamond Community Investors through a preferred claim to the 
first $50,000 in profits (Green, 2006). Profits between $50,000 and $205,000 will be distributed 
to the Jacobs Center and the Neighborhood Unity Foundation. Profits beyond $205,000 will be 
dispersed equally among the shareholders (Green, 2006). In 2005, the Market Creek Plaza earned 
a profit of $128,000, though it was not fully leased. In 2006, Market Creek earned a profit of 
$99,855 after operating expenses, loan interest, depreciation, and lease amortization (Jacobs 
Center for Neighborhood Innovation, 2008). Since the CD-IPO closed in 2006, Diamond 
Community Investors did not receive a dividend in that calendar year. In 2007, the net income of 
the Market Creek Plaza project was $111,236, which allowed for a full dividend of 10% on 
investment for resident investors (Jacobs Center for Neighborhood Innovation, 2008), of which 
eighty-two decided to reinvest in future community development projects (Interview with Jacobs 
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Network contact 2009).  The Market Creek Plaza project provided dividends to neighborhood 
investors for the second time in 2008, when 147 investors chose to reinvest their earnings from 
dividends (Jacobs Network contact #2, personal communication, April 2009).    
As an asset-building tool, it is too early to tell if the Market Creek CD-IPO will 
successfully build an individual investor’s net worth. However, there are both short-term and 
long-term financial benefits of the investment worth noting. In the short term, the investment 
provides annual cash dividends. While residents have received dividends, the monetary amount is 
probably rather small: for a $1,000 investment, the dividend is $100. Even so, this is a higher 
interest rate (10%) than most other savings vehicles with only moderately higher risk for 
neighborhood investors than a savings account, and much less risk than investing in the stock 
market. The long-term nature of the investment tool fulfills the goal of creating long-term wealth 
in that it can show up as an additional asset in a resident’s net worth calculations and can provide 
an experiential learning tool that could lead to further investments. One of the limitations of the 
Market Creek CD-IPO model as an asset-building vehicle for low- and moderate-income 
individuals is the small monetary amount of the investment and the resulting small monetary 
impact. Specifically, an upper limit of $10,000 cannot compare to the amount of equity that 
homeownership could provide. However, the greatest promise of this type of tool is not as a 
substitute for homeownership but, rather, as an asset diversification tool. 
The act of choosing to reinvest dividends by 35% of the Diamond Community Investors 
encourages asset-building through savings because rather than being spent on short-term 
consumption, this money is held in an interest bearing account until the investors decide the best 
place and investment vehicle within the larger project, the forty-five continuous acres of the 
Village at Market Creek (of which Market Creek Plaza makes up ten acres). This commitment to 
long-term neighborhood involvement and neighborhood investment is perhaps the biggest impact 
on inner-city revitalization. There is also an element of community accountability inherent in the 
structure that promotes savings and reinvestment, similar to microlending programs. In 
microlending programs, repayment of loans by individuals often determines the ability of the 
community to expand their financial resources. In the case of the Market Creek CD-IPO, 
reinvestment directly into the community is not mandatory and does not determine project 
growth, but there are clearly implications of social responsibility inherent in participation in the 
project. Expansion of the investment is directly tied to the expansion of wealth in the community; 
direct participation of neighborhood residents is fundamental to the model. 
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3.7: Additional Funds from the Secondary Market:  
Program-Related Investments 
When Jacobs began pursuing the Market Creek Plaza project, project risk was a major 
deterrent for the traditional financial institutions that it approached about project financing 
(Jacobs Network contact #1, personal communication, April 2009). Jacobs approached ten banks, 
and not one was willing to invest in the project.  When Jacobs began to pursue retail tenants 
(which would have strengthened the project to qualify for traditional financing), no potential 
tenants would return calls from Jacobs about the project, even though the Jacobs team had over 
thirty years of development experience.  Jacobs decided to move forward to purchase the 
property, taking on both the majority of the risk and bearing a majority of the costs at the initial 
stage of the project (Jacobs Network contact #1, personal communication, April 2009). While a 
traditional developer would try to move a project forward with little of its own money down and a 
long escrow, Jacobs borrowed no money, but leveraged its own resources ―to the hilt‖ (Jacobs 
Network contact #1, personal communication, April 2009). Once Jacobs purchased the property, 
more tenants were willing to sign on, and Jacobs was able to redistribute its own resources and 
obtain other types of financing. For example, the first retail tenant to open its doors was a Food 4 
Less grocery store that opened in 2003. Once the grocery store was up and running, the income 
from the store could pay debt service on the project so that other profits could be reinvested 
elsewhere in the project. A city planner said, ―[the Food 4 Less] was the first significant piece of 
retail in the area. There was no supermarket or drug store prior. Now, the Food 4 Less is the 






Exhibit 4: Pie Chart of Market Creek Plaza Funding 
Sources 
PRI Investments (Jacobs)
PRI Investments (Other 
Foundations)
Community Investments
New Markets Tax Credit 
Loan
Source:  The Village at Market Creek, 2007
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In addition to the $5.4 million dollars invested in the Market Creek Plaza project by the 
Jacobs Network, affiliated charitable groups, and the Diamond Community Investors, the $18 
million needed to complete financing of the project was provided by funding sources in the 
secondary market, such as Program-Related Investments (PRIs) from other foundations and from 
the federal New Markets Tax Credit program (see Exhibit 4 for a breakdown of project funds). 
Financing from non-Jacobs affiliated PRIs made up 18% of the total financing for the 
Market Creek Plaza project. The Foundation Center (2009), a clearinghouse for information on 
philanthropic organizations, defines PRIs as  
 
investments made by foundations to support charitable activities that involve the potential return 
of capital within an established time frame. PRIs include financing methods commonly associated 
with banks or other private investors, such as loans, loan guarantees, linked deposits, and even 
equity investments in charitable organizations or in commercial ventures for charitable purposes.  
 
 PRIs can be utilized as a funding supplement, often when a non-profit or commercial 
venture cannot obtain financing from traditional sources (The Foundation Center-What is a 
program-related investment?, 2009). For the funder, investing in a PRI is a way to get maximum 
leverage from philanthropic dollars by dedicating the funds to a mission-related project, which 
also has some potential for a financial return (The Foundation Center-What is a program-related 
investment?, 2009).  In the Market Creek Plaza project, foundations such as the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation made two PRIs totaling $1.25 million (Jacobs Center for Neighborhood Innovation, 
2008). The Rockefeller Foundation invested $1 million in the project, its first real estate PRI in 
the history of the foundation (Jacobs Network contact #2, personal communication, April 2009). 
Because of the investment structure and the way the ownership stake is divided, these PRIs would 
not likely gain a return on their investments unless the Market Creek Plaza is tremendously 
profitable.  Most notable about the PRI investments is that the project succeeded in leveraging 
support from these other foundations because the foundations saw some potential in the project as 
a profit-making venture. However, the fact that Market Creek Plaza was forced to utilize 
secondary market sources of funding demonstrates an institutional gap in securing debt from 
regular banks and financial institutions, even though the project was a market-driven project in 
the inner city. Along these lines, the federal New Markets Tax Credit program was able to 
provide additional financial support to fill the institutional gap in the Market Creek Plaza project. 
The next section will explore the low-cost debt provided to the project from the federal New 
Markets Tax Credits program. 
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3.8: Project “Savior”: New Markets Tax Credits 
Jacobs obtained a large amount of secondary market financing from the public sector. By 
providing 64% of the funding for the Market Creek Plaza project (Exhibit 4), federal regulations 
– through the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) program – played a critical role in creating the 
space for this market-driven model to take shape. A Jacobs Network contact called NMTC a 
―savior‖ to the Market Creek project (Jacobs Network contact #2, personal communication, April 
2009). They said, ―Before New Markets Tax Credits were available, there were no programs 
larger than $3 million to help with low-income commercial real estate development projects.‖ 
Based on the financing structure of this and other projects, a tax credit of only $3 million 
probably would not be effective in filling the needed financing gap for larger commercial land 
parcels, due to the difficulty such projects have in obtaining traditional financing. Prior to the 
NMTC program, all the larger tax credits programs for real estate development were focused on 
creating affordable residential developments. Regarding the impact of the savings from the 
NMTC program, another Jacobs Network contact said, ―New Markets Tax Credits have helped to 
keep the cost of money low. Keeping the cost of money low keeps more money in the 
community, the projects more profitable, and [makes] resident ownership possible (personal 
communication, April 2009).‖ Contrary to the standard neoclassical assumptions that public 
regulation makes capital costly, the financing provided by the public sector in this case corrected 
an important market failure common to inner cities. Furthermore, the Market Creek Plaza project 
showed how public spending generated positive externalities by leveraging in non-profit and 
private sector funding.   
The federal New Market Tax Credits (NMTC) program was initiated in 2000 by 
President Clinton’s administration in order to stimulate economic development in economically 
distressed areas.  NMTCs are issued to for-profit entities to administer loans or investments to 
Community Development Finance Institutions (CDFI). The credit to the investor can total up to 
39% of the cost of the investment, and can be claimed for up to seven years. Other federal tax 
credit programs, such as Historic Tax Credits, are limited for all practical purposes by the number 
of properties on the National Register of Historic Places. Since many of the urban and rural areas 
of the United States could potentially be considered economically distressed, the federal 
government created an allocation cap for NMTCs to match the amount of the federal budget 
appropriated for this purpose. For example, $3.5 billion in NMTC funds were allocated in 2008 
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(CDFI Fund - U.S. Treasury - New Markets Tax Credits Program, 2008). Because this funding 
source is in high demand, the process to obtain credits through NMTC can be competitive.  
The Market Creek Plaza project is cited as a success of the NMTC program in several 
studies (Armisted, 2005; Rapoza, Feighan, Bisson, & Halpern, 2005; Bystry, 2005), particularly 
because of the high level of community involvement in the design and execution of the Market 
Creek CD-IPO. In this case, the Clearinghouse CDFI made a permanent loan of $15 million to the 
Jacobs Center for Neighborhood Innovation (The New Markets Tax Credit Program: How This 
Incentive Can Strengthen America's Cities - Community Investments Online, 2007). Wells Fargo 
Bank was the tax credit investor and also opened a branch in the Market Creek shopping center 
(The New Markets Tax Credit Program: How This Incentive Can Strengthen America's Cities - 
Community Investments Online, 2007).  
Because NMTC is primarily a financial tool used for development projects in areas that 
encounter difficulty when trying to qualify for traditional financing, a principle measure of 
program success is the deployment of capital to an economically depressed area (Rapoza, 
Feighan, Bisson, & Halpern, 2005), and not necessarily other measurable community 
development effects. In this regard, Brad Lander, Director of the Pratt Center, critiques this aspect 
of the NMTC program as follows:  
 
NMTC investors increasingly report that the significant majority of their deals are in real estate 
(rather than small business, for example). The largest share of these are retail projects, which may 
offer needed services but generally create the lowest-wage jobs. Relatively few are developed 
through community-oriented processes that build social capital. And in stronger markets, we have 
now seen too many places where long-time residents and businesses see too little benefit from 
rising real estate values. 
   -New Markets Tax Credits: Issues and Opportunities, April 2005 
 
Community development is embedded in the Market Creek Plaza model, which makes it 
unique among NMTC projects.  A few examples of the innovations used in achieving community 
development aims include the use of community-oriented processes, and the intentional 
development of social capital within the Diamond neighborhoods. While not all NMTC projects 
include community development innovations, the incidence of innovation using NMTC has been 
shown in other case studies with the result of developing additional new models for long-term 
economic sustainability. For example, the Katahdin Project in Northern Maine utilized NMTC in 
a rural area to create partnerships between The Nature Conservancy; the Maine-based community 
development corporation, Coastal Enterprises, Inc.; and the Great Northern Paper Company 
(Rapoza, Feighan, Bisson, & Halpern, 2005). The crux of the project was to ―alter the economics 
of owning the timberland‖ to upgrade paper mill operations and to set aside a portion of the land 
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for conservation (Rapoza, Feighan, Bisson, & Halpern, 2005). The Katahdin example 
demonstrates another innovative aspect of many NMTC projects, which is to provide flexibility 
for cross-institutional partnerships in order to create new models for economic development that 
build equity-oriented goals into the model.   
 
3.9: State Institutional Supports for Market Creek Plaza 
 Jacobs Network staff negotiated for certain institutional innovations during the regulatory 
approvals process that they needed to successfully implement the Market Creek Plaza project.  At 
the state level, Jacobs submitted the investment plan for the Market Creek project to the 
California Department of Corporations for approval, and for certification to issue securities to 
neighborhood investors.  Jacobs’s staff indentified a target number of 500 investors or fewer to 
participate in the CD-IPO, in order to fall under state regulatory jurisdiction (Jacobs Network 
contact #2, personal communication, April 2009). There were no precedents for this type of 
securities issuance on the state level.  Offering ―shares‖ to over 500 investors would trigger 
regulation by the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and thus make the CD-
IPO tool subject to federal laws.  Federal regulations would have prevented Jacobs from targeting 
the CD-IPO to its targeted pool of neighborhood investors, among other limitations. 
Because this was a new frontier for both Jacobs and the state, it was a learning process 
for both sides, and they innovated through a collaborative exchange during the process, known as 
―groping along‖ (Behn, 1988). Over a five-year period, a team of residents, foundation staff, and 
lawyers from the Diamond neighborhoods submitted over thirty-five drafts of the Market Creek 
CD-IPO plan (Stuhldreher, 2007).  Successive drafts of the plan were rejected, among other 
things, because the commercial project was not fully leased, because community entrepreneurial 
ventures in the center lowered the project’s value, and because many of the investors did not have 
an annual income over $200,000 (Stuhldreher, 2007). Jacobs argued for two alternative criteria to 
the Department of Corporations standard financial litmus tests, including guidelines that: (1) 
financial qualifications to invest must be flexible enough to permit almost any resident of the 
Diamond Neighborhoods to invest while also limiting his or her exposure to risk, and (2) 
stipulated that Jacobs would screen and educate all participating investors so as to virtually 
guarantee that they understood the risks and potential rewards of the investment (Market Creek 
Partners, 2008).  Eventually, the Department of Corporations agreed to approve the Market Creek 
CD-IPO based on a ―10-10-10‖ rule, which allows residents to invest up to ten percent of their 
income, or ten percent of their net worth, up to $10,000 (Market Creek Partners, 2008). The 
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Market Creek CD-IPO was approved in early 2006 (Robinson, 2005). While this policy 
innovation may have paved the way for future alternative investment projects in California, it 
would be difficult to replicate because of the customization required on a state-by-state basis. In 
contrast, receiving this type of certification at the federal level would likely be too cumbersome. 
 
3.10: City Institutional Supports for Market Creek Plaza 
City-level planning tools were overlaid on the Market Creek project area, which were 
intended to help prioritize the project within the city for planning-related approvals and capital 
budget expenditures. Participation in San Diego’s ―Pilot Village‖ program and designation of the 
area as a Business Improvement District (BID) were two city programs that were supposed to 
provide benefits to developers and business owners, but in practice did not seem to significantly 
aid in the project’s development.   
In February 2004, the San Diego City Council approved a ―Pilot Village‖ program for 
five neighborhood areas across the city as an incentive-driven revitalization effort. Market Creek 
Plaza was one pilot village. In order to qualify, pilot villages were required to meet certain smart 
growth principles such as one transit stop within half a mile, a mixed use development plan, and 
density minimums (City of San Diego, 2002). The five designated pilot villages were eligible for 
incentives including: (1) priorities on infrastructure upgrades or replacements; (2) deferral on 
collection of fees; (3) funding sources such as handicapped access, rebates on property taxes, and 
revolving loan funds; and (4) assistance related to policies and regulations on the undergrounding 
of utilities, affordable housing, and Community Development Block Grants. However, a Jacobs 
representative indicated to me that Jacobs was promised help from the city in the form of priority 
processing and priority infrastructure dollars under the Pilot Village program, but that they have 
not received much help on the Market Creek Project in the form of subsidies (Jacobs Network 
contact #1, personal communication, April 2009). In 2009, the Market Creek pilot village is the 
only remaining active project of the original five pilot villages because the other developments 
never gained the same initial momentum.  
San Diego’s Office of Small Business designated the Diamond neighborhoods as a 
Business Improvement District (BID). In San Diego, a BID works by organizing a group of 
neighborhood businesses through a fee assessed and collected by the City, for use promoting and 
improving the business area (City of San Diego).  Small businesses in designated BIDs are also 
eligible for additional grant funding from the City, and for aid with marketing and lobbying 
efforts (City of San Diego).  Consequently, designation as a pilot village would likely gain 
  [25] 
 
Market Creek Plaza a deferral on BID fees, and since they did not receive priority on technical 
assistance or grants, there is essentially no net impact of these programs on the Diamond 
Neighborhoods.      
Within the toolbox of city planning, other economic development tools such as 
Enterprise/Empowerment Zones or Tax Increment Financing (TIF) districts can provide possible 
sources of tax breaks or future revenues. Both of these tools are placed-based, similar to the 
application of the BID tool in San Diego. While Enterprise/Empowerment Zones often provide 
tax breaks to local businesses in order to incentivize inner-city or minority-owned businesses, 
TIFs use future gains in taxes to finance current infrastructure improvements that will presumably 
create those tax gains. Both of these market-driven incentives are the types of tools that Porter 
endorses. Because of the way the Market Creek CD-IPO directly involved neighborhood 
entrepreneurs and charitable groups, the structure in effect funneled its own capital directly into a 
placed-based economic development tool. While the Market Creek Plaza project probably would 
not have turned away additional market-based subsidies from city government, there is a chance 
that additional regulatory layers could have been a hindrance to the project. While fast-track or 
priority permitting programs did not work well in this case, they have proven to successfully 
incentivize development in other cities like Chicago and San Francisco. While the city of San 
Diego could have been crippled by a lack of resources, similar to many other American cities, the 
city itself had the most to gain by trying harder to dovetail its efforts with Jacobs’s efforts in order 
to capitalize on the successful growth and revitalization of southeast San Diego.  
 
3.11: Workforce Training and Long-Term Capacity-Building Impacts 
 The Market Creek project did actualize some of the Diamond neighbors’ initial goals of 
attracting community entrepreneurs and of providing jobs in the neighborhood (Exhibit 5). 
During the construction phase of the project, Jacobs was able to hire 100% of contractors from 
the 4
th
 District (which includes the Diamond Neighborhoods), 40% of which were minority or 
women-owned contractors (Jacobs Network #1, personal communication, April 2009). The 
standard practice in San Diego is to grant between 3-4% of construction contracts are granted to 
minority and women-owned firms (Jacobs Network #1, personal communication, April 2009); 
thus the Jacobs Network was able to hire from underrepresented groups at a much higher rate. In 
2007, 72% of jobs at Market Creek Plaza were held by neighborhood residents and 88% of jobs 
were held by minority employees (Jacobs Center for Neighborhood Innovation, 2008). 
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Community residents are taking their vision for locally-owned businesses a step further, 
by working with Jacobs to create social enterprise businesses at Market Creek (Jacobs Network 
contact #2, personal communication, April 2009). The new Joe & Vi Jacobs Center includes 
space for a new social enterprise business. Jacobs Network contact #2 said, ―The first floor of the 
center is an events and meetings space, and there is an associated cultural culinary kitchen that 
provides banquet services and catering. The goal for the Market Creek Events & Venues social 
enterprise is to have it running at a profit by 2014.‖  Regarding the job training aspects of the 
project, the contact said, ―The business has hired people from the community and there is 
capacity-building job training occurring, which should help people transition to the hospitality 
industry if they want to, which 
is the second-largest 
employment industry in San 
Diego.‖    
Overall, these job 
impacts are impressive in 
terms of the percentage of 
local hiring and minority 
representation of workers for 
construction and operations.  
However, for a neighborhood 
area of over 88,000 people, it 
would be more beneficial if 
there were more than 193 
jobs. Also, only 50% of 
employers are providing benefits, and even at that percentage, it is not clear that all workers 
would receive benefits from employers that do provide them. Grocery stores, for example, often 
provide benefits to management employees but not to cashiers and baggers. Although this is not 
the case with the Food 4 Less grocery store that anchors the Market Creek Plaza project, where 
the jobs are unionized and include living wages and health care (PolicyLink - Market Creek 
Plaza), the point is worth noting.  The effort to create a business incubator and job training space 
for workers in the hospitality industry is a good one, but needs to be developed further. Even if 
the hospitality industry is growing in San Diego, many hospitality jobs are low-wage jobs, and 
the hospitality market may be sensitive to economic downturns. The long-term sustainability of 
 
Exhibit 5: Market Creek Plaza Employment Figures, 2007 
Number of Employers 12 
Employers Providing Benefits 6 
Total Jobs 193 
Full-time Jobs 77 
Part-time Jobs 116 
Employees from  Southeastern San Diego Zip Codes 138 
Minority Employees 169 
Percentage of Community Employment 72% 
Percentage of Minority Employees 88% 
Source: Jacobs Center for Neighborhood Innovation, 2008 
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this type of program depends on the type of job training that is being provided and on job 
placement networks, among other things.  
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Section 4:  A Word about the Economic Downturn  
Since the initial success of the Market Creek CD-IPO, the financial markets have 
crashed, credit markets have frozen, retail sales have slumped, and real estate has lost value. 
Since the model was still relatively new at the time of the financial crisis, there has not been 
adequate time to study the CD-IPO’s impact as an asset-building investment strategy. Jacobs 
Network contact #2 said that the retail center is still doing well overall; though some of the retail 
tenants have dropped off, the dividends have not. The Food 4 Less grocery store has been able to 
increase sales, while the big chains such as Starbucks and Wells Fargo are still making profits. 
Some of the local restaurants have struggled as sales have gone down and costs have gone up, but 
Jacobs has been able to provide some technical assistance to businesses to help them weather the 
economic downturn (Jacobs Network contact #1, personal communication, April 2009). For 
example, Jacobs worked with a Mexican restaurant in the shopping center to offer all-you-can-eat 
buffets on certain nights to help keep costs affordable for residents and to get people in the door 
at the restaurant. Regarding this business support, Jacobs Network contact #1 said, ―It is an 
emerging market and you must continually invest in it.‖ 
With respect to the investment vehicle, Jacobs structured the CD-IPO in an attempt to 
buffer the investors’ losses as much as possible to mitigate risk, but residents are not able to 
withdraw money in the short term if the project stops producing dividends. This is unlike other 
asset-building savings strategies like IDAs, where participants could continue to save and match 
savings independent of market conditions.  However, other investments such as stocks or 401(k)s 
are long-term investments as well and are also subject to fluctuations in the market.  The question 
is: how are lower- or moderate-income investors positioned to withstand these fluctuations? The 
―10-10-10‖ investor qualifying rule attempted to address this question at the time of investment, 
but a long-range evaluation of this matter should be included in further study of the Market Creek 
Plaza project.   
Even if the project itself is doing well, future growth of the project is not independent of 
market conditions that affect city and state budgets. Regarding the future development at the 
Village at Market Creek, it appears that the Jacobs Network groups will be on their own to fund 
project development, and will not be able to rely on city or state funding sources. Phase II of the 
Village at Market Creek project includes the development of over 800 units of affordable 
housing; Jacobs Network contact #1 said that it has taken seven years for the city to grant a 
zoning request for Phase II, which is much longer than was hoped for by Jacobs. The contact 
attributed this situation to the dire state of current city and state budgets and the resulting limited 
resources. A city planner reinforced this idea by explaining that Jacobs had applied for some state 
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bond funding for Phase II of the project, and the funding ultimately stalled (personal 
communication, January 2009). The planner said that voters approved the issuance of Prop 1C 
bonds, which included funding for the Jacobs’ project, but the state treasurer suspended the bond 
issuance indefinitely because of the California state budget crisis.  
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Section 5:  Conclusion & Lessons for Planners  
The Market Creek CD-IPO model makes a distinct nod towards the free-market approach 
advocated by Michael Porter, because it is based on the principle of direct investment by residents 
as an instrument for inner-city revitalization. However, the market alone did not facilitate the 
vehicle for this investment, and in fact, would have prevented this type of model from developing 
on its own. The Jacobs Network succeeded in its entrepreneurial approach to developing the 
Market Creek CD-IPO because it was intentional about its desired outcomes when it created its 
own institutional framework, and because it innovated with the help of federal programs and state 
agencies throughout the process to achieve the additional supports that the project needed to 
survive in the free market. This result supports what Harrison and Glasmeier and Bates 
advocated: that community development groups and government can be the drivers of strategic 
market intervention that catalyzes inner-city revitalization. Economic opportunity is present in 
inner cities and can be harnessed by the private sector, but planners and economic developers 
must take an active role to shape the institutions that can channel this opportunity in more 
directed and socially desirable ways. 
Throughout this case study I have shown how this seemingly novel model was actually 
constructed from elements of other existing and standard practices. Examining the institutional 
elements that led to the success of the Market Creek CD-IPO will allow planners to generalize 
this case to apply some of the ideas in other places. The next several paragraphs will reiterate 
some of the main ideas and tools that were built into the Market Creek CD-IPO, which can be 
used elsewhere by planners and economic developers. 
First, Jacobs embedded grassroots community involvement throughout the planning, 
implementation and operations phases of the project. Jacobs solicited input from the community, 
not only to create buy-in, but to craft the type of project that was going to be most effective for 
the Diamond neighborhood community. Jacobs did not just give lip-service to ―resident 
ownership‖ but built the financial and ownership structure of Market Creek Plaza to represent this 
value and support this outcome. Similar to job training programs like Project QUEST, Jacobs 
provided supportive resources to participants such as child care and meals during evening 
meetings, and even stipends to residents who made a large time commitment to planning and 
implementation of the project. These supportive resources enabled residents, who may otherwise 
be limited by their socioeconomic situation, to participate in the project. Also, Jacobs is currently 
working with neighborhood residents to develop the institutions that will manage the project once 
the foundation transitions out in 20 years; neighborhood-run organizations will have full 
ownership of the project in the future, which makes their participation throughout the project both 
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strategic and essential. Similar to microlending programs, community involvement in the Market 
Creek Plaza project was parlayed into community responsibility, even an obligation, to commit to 
long-term investment and participation in the project. This long-term personal investment in the 
community is vital to neighborhood revitalization.  
Secondly, Jacobs played both an entrepreneurial and a non-profit role when it took on the 
initial risk of the project, despite the lack of interest from mainstream financial institutions and 
retail tenants. Jacobs built up the project by leveraging its own resources, and thus was able to 
lower the element of risk as the project proceeded. Lower risk, in turn, attracted retail tenants and 
additional financing to the project in the later stages of development. Accordingly, the Jacobs 
Network assumed a long-term view of profitability expectations. Pursuit of a delayed financial 
return contrasts the typical valuation of risk/return and the short-term financial expectations of a 
standard investment, but is not out of character for philanthropic grant-making or for socially 
responsible investment groups (Baxter, 1996). Jacobs prioritized profit-sharing with community 
investors ahead of the foundation’s profit gains by offering the investors a preferred return.  
Additionally, Jacobs structured the ownership stake in the project to value resident investor 
participation by assigning one vote to one person instead of distributing votes by the percentage 
of financial investment.  Planners can learn from the way Jacobs built long-term financial 
sustainability into the structure of the Market Creek project. 
Thirdly, Jacobs used creative secondary market sources to complete project financing. 
The most innovative source of secondary market financing was to utilize funds from low- and 
moderate-income resident investors because it also served as a community development tool to 
build equity within the neighborhood.  The alternative criterion used to evaluate the financial 
suitability of neighborhood investors have been used in other programs that operate successfully 
in the secondary market. Similar to low- and moderate-income homeownership programs, Jacobs 
was able to lower the investment amount required for participation and thus lower the risk to low- 
and moderate-income investors. The California Department of Corporations also required 
financial counseling of potential investors so that they were educated about the risks, and the 
potential gains, which occurs similarly in IDA programs and first-time homeownership programs. 
Additionally, Jacobs utilized foundation support through the vehicle of Program-Related 
Investments, which gave it flexibility to offer a lower or slower return, or perhaps no return at all, 
on money invested in the project by foundations. Federal New Markets Tax Credits provided a 
source of low-cost gap financing that was otherwise unavailable from mainstream financial 
institutions because of project risk and its location in a low-income inner-city area. At sixty-four 
percent of project financing, this program made the project plausible. Planners should utilize 
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sources of funding from different levels of government and different types of organization to 
facilitate innovations that will enhance inner city revitalization efforts. 
Finally, city planners should evaluate their own programs, and try to change them if they 
cannot deliver on program goals. Perhaps the most disappointing part of this case study was the 
failure of San Diego city agencies to deliver on some of their own program incentives. While it is 
challenging to work within tightening budget constraints, planners must find ways to aid in 
creating economic development with equity, perhaps by utilizing some of the ideas presented in 
the Market Creek CD-IPO model.  
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